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Abstract 
 
BOUNDARY EXTENSION AND PERCEIVED MOTION 
 
Sarah G. Hinnant  
B.S., Appalachian State University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson:  Christopher A. Dickinson 
 
 
Boundary extension is a memory error in which a person remembers seeing beyond the 
boundaries of a view (Intraub & Richardson, 1989). Representational momentum is another 
type of memory error, in which a person remembers the last seen position of a moving object 
being further along its trajectory path than it actually was (Hubbard, 1995). The goal of this 
experiment was to assess the influence of implied motion on boundary extension. On each 
trial within the three experiments, participants saw a picture of a scene with an object that 
moved either forward or backward, in either a coherent manner or not. Memory for the views 
was measured with a border-adjustment task. Results revealed a significant effect of motion 
direction. When motion direction was forward, participants moved the approaching border 
significantly inward, toward the object. When motion direction was backward, participants 
moved the approaching border significantly outward. This implies that participants’ 
knowledge about the type of motion depicted in a scene influences memory. 
 Keywords: boundary extension, representational momentum, memory  
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Boundary Extension and Perceived Motion 
 Our experience of what we see is a continuous, detailed, and what we believe to be an 
accurate view of the world. Our mental representations, however, are not nearly as 
continuous, detailed, or accurate as we perceive them to be (O’Regan, 1992). In reality, we 
are perceiving snapshots that are strung together, with gaps of missing information in 
between these snapshots (O’Regan, 1992). 
Examples of the disconnect between how we think we perceive the world and the 
actual nature of our mental representations suggest that the way we see the world is as though 
it is continuous and highly detailed.  This is based, at least partially, on the nature of the 
input, where each eye fixation is a snapshot that is highly detailed in the center, but whose 
detail drops off rapidly (Carrasco & McElree, 2001). Change blindness is a good example of 
the disconnect between how we think we perceive the world and how we actually perceive it 
(Simons, 2000). Change blindness is a phenomenon in which individuals fail to detect fairly 
significant changes to the visual details of the scenes and objects within the scenes (Levin, 
Simons, Angelone, & Chabris, 2002). Change blindness occurs when interruptions such as 
saccades, blinks, movie cuts, and blank screens interrupt the visual field. 
Visual input itself appears to be discontinuous. An example of this is that our eyes 
alternate between fixations and saccades, which means we are constantly engaged in a 
perception-memory cycle of vision (Matin, 1974). That is, visual input is suppressed during 
saccades, leaving memory to take its place (Matin, 1974). This exemplifies the discontinuous 
nature of vision; specifically, our visual experience is knitted together from a series of 
snapshots we obtain from fixations. As this appears to be the true nature of the input to our 
visual experience, one must wonder what fills in the gaps between these snapshots. In other 
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words, the nature of our visual experience cannot be explained by the bottom-up input we 
receive from the visual system alone. Something else must contribute to our experience of 
continuity. One type of top-down process that could possibly serve this purpose is boundary 
extension.  
Overview of Boundary Extension 
Boundary extension is a type of memory error in which a person remembers more of 
a view than what they actually saw (Intraub & Richardson, 1989). For example, if you were 
to look through a window to view the yard outside, you may only see part of the yard, but 
you also understand what is beyond the window’s edges. Both your conceptual 
understanding of what you are seeing, as well as what you are actually seeing are part of your 
representation. This being the case, if you were to take part in a memory test for what you 
actually saw, you would be likely to remember having seen what appeared beyond the edges 
of the view, and you would have experienced boundary extension.  
One of the most robust findings in the boundary extension literature is that different 
views elicit boundary extension to either a greater or a lesser degree. Close-up views 
typically elicit the most boundary extension, whereas wide-angle views elicit less (Gottesman 
& Intraub, 2002; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008; Intraub & Richardson, 1989). A close-up view 
contains a view of an object that appears larger, closer, and with less of the background 
showing than that of a wide-angle view, which makes the object smaller and shows much 
more of the background. This finding has been interpreted to suggest that because close-up 
views show less background, there is less context available available in the view to cue a 
person’s memory (Intraub & Richardson, 1989). 
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The type of view has a large impact on the amount of boundary extension 
experienced, yet another well supported finding is that warning a person about boundary 
extension does not prevent the memory error from occurring (Gagnier, Dickinson, & Intraub, 
2013; Intraub & Bodamer, 1992). Intraub and Bodamer (1992) instructed participants to draw 
pictures of previously viewed scenes. After the participants completed their drawings, the 
experimenter informed the participants that for most people, their drawings would contain 
more of the scene than what was actually shown in the view. The participants were then 
shown different views, followed by another memory test. Intraub and Bodamer (1992) found 
that warning a person about boundary extension did not prevent boundary extension from 
occurring.  
 Boundary extension has also been found to occur after very brief retention intervals 
(Intraub & Dickinson, 2008; Intraub, Hoffman, Wetherhold, & Stoehs, 2006). Intraub and 
Dickinson (2008) showed that boundary extension occurs with a retention interval of only 42 
ms. On the other hand, Intraub, Hoffman, et al. (2006) found that boundary extension can 
still occur after a 2000 ms retention interval. Several other findings suggest that boundary 
extension is a robust phenomenon, occurring across the lifespan, and beginning in infancy 
(Intraub, Bender, & Mangels, 1992). 
Theoretical Explanations for Boundary Extension 
Intraub, Bender, and Mangels (1992) provided a framework for explaining boundary 
extension with the perceptual schema hypothesis. They tested three alternate explanations of 
boundary extension, which were the object completion hypothesis, the perceptual schema 
hypothesis, and the memory schema hypothesis. They discussed and tested these hypotheses 
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in the context of how we remember pictures, as opposed to how we remember partial views 
of the world around us. 
Object Completion Hypothesis. Intraub et al. (1992) explained that the object 
completion hypothesis predicts that boundary extension occurs as an attempt to complete an 
object being viewed when only part of the object is actually visible (e.g., a view of a trashcan 
where part of the trashcan is not visible because it is cut off by one of the picture’s side 
borders). They further hypothesized that boundary extension cannot be explained by the 
object completion hypothesis and that boundary extension should occur with objects that are 
entirely visible.  
 Memory schema hypothesis. According to the proposal of the memory schema 
hypothesis by Intraub et al. (1992), the memory schema serves as a guide that integrates the 
successive glimpses of the visual world. It is an abstract representation that contains memory 
for information that was previously fixated upon, as well as the contents of future fixations.  
According to the memory schema hypothesis, boundary extension is caused by normalization 
of the scene to a mental prototype of what is typically included in that type of scene. A 
mental prototype would be a representation of the view that is somewhere between a close-up 
view and a wide-angle view. According to the memory schema hypothesis, there should be 
no directional distortion of prototypic pictures, and wide-angle views should elicit boundary 
restriction. Although the memory schema hypothesis can account for boundary extension, 
Intraub et al. (1992) suggested that a more comprehensive explanation is the perceptual 
schema hypothesis.  
Perceptual schema hypothesis. The perceptual schema hypothesis is based on the 
assumptions that perception of the picture involves activating a mental schema for the scene 
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that gives observers a quick understanding of what probably exists beyond the boundaries of 
the picture, and the information provided in the schema will most likely become combined 
with the person’s mental representation of the picture. The perceptual schema can be 
described as something that allows us to perceive an object that we have never seen as a 
whole and extrapolate information about the world around us that we cannot perceive 
visually (Intraub et al., 1992). They predicted that the perceptual schema hypothesis would 
best explain boundary extension and that the perceptual schema hypothesis attributes 
boundary extension to the first understanding of the view. The first comprehension of the 
view includes expectations taken from the schema about what is outside of the boundaries of 
the view. As an explanation for boundary extension, the perceptual schema hypothesis 
predicts that close-up views will elicit more boundary extension, whereas wide-angle views 
will not elicit boundary extension at all. This is because close-up views do not contain a 
strong context for where the object is in the space and leave room for error by potentially 
incorporating other sources of input (e.g., knowledge about the view as a whole, not just 
what is seen), whereas wide-angle views provide a much better sense of context (Intraub et 
al., 1992).  
Experiment 1 of Intraub et al. (1992) had four conditions: close-up version at 
presentation and test (CC), a medium version that was more wide-angle than the close-ups at 
presentation and test (MM), a close-up version at presentation and medium version at test 
(CM), and a medium version at presentation and close-up version at test (MC). The four test 
conditions allowed the researchers to assess the predictions of three different hypotheses 
discussed previously. Some of the pictures contained objects that were cropped, whereas 
other pictures contained objects that were not cropped. All stimuli were pictures of objects on 
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natural backgrounds, such as a dust pan on the ground or a boy sitting against a wall, and 
each picture had a close-up and medium version. 
 Participants were shown 16 pictures for 15 s each. Eight were presented in their 
close-up version, and eight were presented in their medium version; then 48 hr later, 
participants returned to the lab for the recognition test. For the recognition test, the scenes 
were shown in the same order as in the presentation phase. The same order was used so that 
the participants would experience the same viewing context in order to maximize the 
participants’ accuracy. Eight of the scenes were shown in the same version as in presentation 
(CC and MM conditions), and eight were shown in the other version (CM and MC 
conditions). Participants were instructed to decide whether the test picture was either more 
close-up, more wide-angle, or the same as the stimulus view. The results of Experiment 1 
indicated that the close-up pictures elicited boundary extension, but the medium angle 
pictures did not. Unlike the close-up pictures, the medium angle pictures did not show any 
directional distortion. In the MC and CM conditions, an asymmetrical pattern was seen, in 
which the participants did recognize that the test views were different from the stimulus 
views. The mean ratings suggest that participants could tell that test views were different 
from stimulus views, but in the CM condition, mean ratings were closer to the same view 
than the MC condition. In other words, participants appeared to extend the picture boundaries 
slightly more in the CM condition than in the MC condition. The results of Experiment 1 
indicate that boundary extension cannot be attributed to object completion, because boundary 
extension occurred despite the fact that half of the objects in the pictures were not cropped 
(Intraub et al., 1992). 
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In Experiment 2 of Intraub, et al. (1992), the predictions for the memory schema and 
perceptual schema hypotheses were tested for pictures rated in the typical range or as wide-
angle views (e.g., prior to the start of the experiments, a separate group of participants rated 
all of the stimuli in terms of how close-up or wide-angle they thought they were, and that is 
how they operationally defined close-up, prototypic, and wide-angle views). Typical range 
pictures were essentially medium-angle photographs, in which the camera angle was between 
a wide-angle view and a close-up view.  According to the memory schema hypothesis, it was 
predicted that participants should show no directional distortion of prototypic pictures (i.e., 
medium version rather than close-up or wide-angle) and should restrict the boundaries of 
wide-angle pictures. According to the perceptual schema hypothesis, prototypic pictures 
should elicit boundary extension, while wide-angle pictures should not. The retention 
intervals differed from Experiment 1, in that there were two different retention intervals. The 
intervals were immediate retention intervals where participants were tested after they were 
given the instructions for the memory test which took about 3 min with a 48 hr retention 
interval. The purpose of adding the immediate retention interval was to test for the idea that 
the distortion predicted by the perceptual schema hypothesis might be immediately apparent. 
The results of Experiment 2 indicated that participants had better memory for the 
picture boundaries in the immediate retention interval compared to the delay retention 
interval. In support of the perceptual schema hypothesis, results revealed that picture type 
had a large effect on participants’ memory for the picture boundaries, where boundary 
extension occurred for the prototypic pictures but not for the wide-angle pictures (Intraub et 
al., 1992). 
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 In Experiment 3, the goal was to replicate Experiment 2 by using an independent 
design for the picture type where there were no distracter pictures, and all of the test pictures 
were identical to the stimulus pictures. All three views and both retention intervals were 
tested. The two conditions were picture view and retention interval. Intraub et al. (1992) 
predicted that boundary extension would be obtained when picture types were not mixed. 
Results of Experiment 3 revealed that the pattern of boundary errors was greatly influenced 
by picture type and time. Specifically, boundary extension occurred in all conditions except 
for the wide-angle condition. Instead of eliciting boundary extension, the wide-angle views 
elicited boundary restriction (Intraub et al., 1992). 
Overall, the results of Intraub et al. (1992) indicated that close-up pictures elicit 
boundary extension, while wide-angle photographs do not. Their results suggest that 
boundary extension cannot be attributed to object completion, because half of the pictures 
contained main objects that were not cropped at all by the boundaries of the picture. Even 
though this was the case, boundary extension still occurred (Intraub et al., 1992). The results 
of Intraub et al. (1992) provide strong support for the perceptual schema hypothesis.  
More recent evidence suggests that the perceptual schema hypothesis may not 
provide the most complete explanation of how boundary extension occurs. Intraub and 
Dickinson (2008) have argued that boundary extension is a source-monitoring error, as 
explained by a multisource model of scene perception (Intraub, 2010). Intraub and Dickinson 
(2008) looked to see if they could find some retention interval that was so brief that boundary 
extension would not occur. They found that their results were not entirely consistent with the 
predictions of the perceptual schema model. According to the perceptual schema model, 
boundary extension is predicted to be purely a memory based phenomenon, meaning that 
9 
 
boundary extension happens in memory after the stimulus has been removed. Intraub and 
Dickinson (2008) found that boundary extension can occur with a masked retention interval 
as brief as 42 ms and suggested that it was too brief an interval for boundary extension to be 
occurring in memory after the stimulus is removed. 
 Intraub and Dickinson (2008) suggested that the multisource model can account for 
boundary extension. This multisource model assumes that we carry around with us a sense of 
space that we fill in with different sources of information, including vision, amodal 
processes, and general world knowledge (Intraub, 2010). According to this model, the filling 
in happens continuously during perception, meaning that while a person is seeing a partial 
view of the world, their mental representation of the world is being filled in with with amodal 
information and general world knowledge. Amodal processes refer to what is not in a sensory 
modality (e.g., remembering a completed object because of knowledge of what the object is, 
instead of remembering what you actually saw – part of the object). In the case of boundary 
extension, you are completing visual input at the edges of the view with information that is 
not in a sensory modality. This occurs when a person does not have all of the relevant visual 
information in a view; they fill in the gaps of missing information with top-down information 
(Intraub, 2010). An example of this could be looking at a view of a dog where the edge of the 
view ends at the dog’s torso, showing only the front half of the dog. Even though the  dog is 
not visible in its entirety, your categorical understanding of what you are looking at, or top-
down processing, completes the dog in your mind with the knowledge of what the category 
“dog” includes, so a dog has four legs, paws, fur, etc. General world knowledge encompasses 
what you know, in general, about the world around you. You know that houses typically 
contain doors, walls, and so on. According to the multisource model, then, boundary 
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extension is the result of a source-monitoring error, which involves attributing non-visual 
information to a visual source, which means that something is always being added to what 
we see (Dickinson & Intraub, 2008). 
 Dickinson and Intraub (2008) examined the early time course of boundary extension, 
in which they addressed how time affects boundary extension. Specifically, they examined 
whether, after some retention interval, boundary extension might not occur (i.e., memory for 
a view would be accurate). In Experiment 1 participants were presented with four different 
stimulus view/test view combinations, including close-up stimulus, close-up test picture 
(CC); wide-angle stimulus, wide-angle test picture (WW); close-up stimulus, wide-angle test 
picture (CW); and wide-angle stimulus, close-up test picture (WC). Masked intervals were 
100, 250, 625, or 1000 ms. All four trial types were randomly intermixed in each condition. 
Stimuli included photographs of people doing various activities, such as kicking a ball across 
a field. On each trial participants saw a sequence of three pictures for 325 ms each, and their 
memory was tested for one of the three. The test picture appeared in the same location as the 
stimulus picture, to the left of the stimulus picture, or to the right of the stimulus picture. A 
memory test was given to participants after viewing the test picture, in which participants 
were asked if the view was the same as what they saw before, or if it was more close-up or 
more wide-angle than before. Boundary extension was shown to occur after only a 100 ms 
interruption as well as for all other retention intervals. 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to take a closer look at the effect of time when 
participants did not have to make a saccade from the location of the stimulus picture to the 
location of the test picture. Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1, except that all test 
pictures and stimuli were presented in the center of the computer screen. Masked intervals in 
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Experiment 2 were 42, 100, or 250 ms (Dickinson & Intraub, 2008). The results of 
Experiment 2 revealed that wide-angle views elicited less boundary extension than close-up 
views. Close-up views elicited boundary extension for each of the retention intervals. It was 
found that although observers knew what would be tested on each trial, a disruption lasting 
for less than 1/20
th
 of a second was sufficient for boundary extension to occur, and results 
suggested that boundary extension occurs rapidly enough to play a role in view integration 
during visual scanning (Dickinson & Intraub, 2008). 
The focus Experiments 3a and 3b were to readdress the question of whether or not 
boundary extension would be influenced by a shift in gaze. The masked intervals were the 
same duration as in Experiment 2. All stimuli in Experiment 3 were identical close-ups, all 
stimuli were shown on one side of the screen, and test pictures were shown either in the same 
location or on the other side of the screen. However, in Experiment 3b, eye-tracking was 
used to record participants’ eye movements. Results revealed that boundary extension can be 
seen even after a shift in gaze (Dickinson & Intraub, 2008).  
Overall, Dickinson and Intraub (2008) found that boundary extension can occur after 
an interruption of a view that lasts as little as 42 ms. Boundary extension was found to occur 
after a masked interval of 1 s, 625 ms, 250 ms, 100 ms, and 42 ms. 
Representational Momentum 
The theme of continuation beyond what was provided by perceptual information is 
common to another type of memory error. There is a body of research on a type of false 
memory called representational momentum (Freyd & Finke, 1984). Representational 
momentum is a type of memory error defined by Delucia and Maldia (2006) as a memory 
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distortion in which individuals remember the final location of a moving object as being 
further along or more forward in its trajectory path than it actually was.   
Freyd and Finke (1984) provided a foundation for the representational momentum 
literature, which consisted of three experiments that measured the changes in mental 
representation of a pattern that was presented visually, in which the pattern was induced 
through a sequence of displays that were static.  
Experiment 1 involved showing participants a view of a rectangle in which three 
different orientations were depicted along the rectangle’s possible rotation path. Each 
different orientation was separated by a 250 ms interstimulus interval. Participants were told 
to remember the third orientation for each sequence. They were then shown a rectangle at the 
fourth orientation after a delay of 250 ms. This was either different from, or the same as the 
rectangle’s third orientation. A rectangle could be different in two ways. It could either be 
rotated slightly in the same direction, or it could be rotated slightly in the opposite direction. 
Participants were asked to indicate if the objects orientation was the same, or if it was 
different from the previous view. The results of Experiment 1 showed that participants 
experienced much more memory error when attempting to detect differences in the direction 
of the motion, meaning that participants misremembered the final position of the object as 
being further along in its rotational path than it actually was. This means that participants 
were more likely to say “same” if the rectangle was rotated slightly in the same direction than 
if it was rotated slightly in the opposite direction. The participant’s memory for the third 
orientation of the rectangle was distorted in the implied direction of rotation.  
The goal of Experiment 2 was to see if reversing the order of the first two object 
orientations (e.g., to elicit an inconsistent path of implied motion) would make the effect 
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found in Experiment 1 disappear. They found that the effect disappeared. In Experiment 3 the 
authors found that implied motion of the effect can still be found up to 500 ms, and 
furthermore, can occur between 250 and 333 ms, or less than the blink of an eye. This means 
that after delaying the appearance of the test object, representational momentum still 
occurred. The results from these experiments were interpreted as support for a mental 
analogue to the momentum of a physical object in movement (Freyd & Finke, 1984).  
We currently know that representational momentum is a type of memory error that 
appears to incorporate expectations or predictions about a moving object’s position along its 
trajectory path (Hubbard, 1995). Hubbard (1995) described representational momentum as a 
phenomenon in which memory of the location of a target in motion is displaced toward the 
direction of the motion.  
According to Hubbard (1995), representational momentum reflects properties of 
mental representation as well as properties of the world. Hubbard (1995) suggested that a 
potential functional purpose of representational momentum is that the displacement could 
help spatial localization, by bridging the gap between perception and action. In other words, 
representational momentum may help a person to process the movement of an object toward 
a particular direction, and incorporate this information into the memory of the scene. 
Reed and Vinson (1996) gave a description of representational momentum, 
incorporating what we know of a scene from the standpoint of basic physics. A moving 
object has physical momentum that it carries with it along its trajectory path. To stop the 
object, an opposing force must be applied to it, but unless the force is strong enough, the 
object will keep moving for a certain amount of time, over a specific distance. Similar to a 
moving object with physical momentum, a representation of a moving object has 
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representational momentum. Therefore, representational momentum can be thought of as the 
mind accounting for what it knows about the laws of the physical world, in an attempt to 
make a prediction dealing with time. To understand how representational momentum applies 
to the real world, if you were to watch a person throw a Frisbee across a field, and look away 
before the Frisbee hit the ground, you would probably remember the last snap shot of the 
Frisbees last seen location in the air, as being further along its trajectory path than what you 
actually saw. Furthermore, Reed and Vinson (1996) discussed how conceptual knowledge 
about how specific objects move or do not move, appears to affect representational 
momentum. In other words, a person’s knowledge that a specific object appears to be moving 
in a scene could cause the person to remember the object being further along in its trajectory 
path than it actually was. 
 
Boundary Extension and Representational Momentum 
Boundary extension and representational momentum are memory errors that appear to 
share some surface similarities. Both concern the concept of prediction, whether it deals with 
predicting future events in the case of representational momentum, or with predicting what is 
outside of the boundaries of a view in the case of boundary extension (Munger, Owens, & 
Conway, 2005). Both share the idea that we anticipate what has not yet been viewed, whether 
the predictive factor is the scene, as in the case of boundary extension, or whether the 
predictive factor is time, in the case of representational momentum (Intraub, 2002). These 
similarities imply that boundary extension and representational momentum appear to share 
the same purpose of allowing someone to infer information about the visual world that is 
based on expectation. Both are found when memory is tested within tens of milliseconds 
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after the offset of a stimulus disappears (Hubbard, 1995). Both boundary extension and 
representational momentum, therefore, appear to be quite similar phenomena. A more 
extensive comparison of the two memory errors, however, reveals differences that help 
answer the question of whether or not representational momentum and boundary extension 
share similar mechanisms or not.  
 Representational momentum happens when an individual misreports a moving 
object’s final or last seen position as being further along its trajectory field than it really was 
(Intraub, 2002). In the case of boundary extension, on the other hand, the phenomena occurs 
when the individual misremembers the boundaries of the pictures borders and remembers 
seeing more of the view than they really did (Intraub, 2002). These differences imply that the 
predictor factor for each of the two memory errors is different. Boundary extension is a 
prediction about space that lies outside the edges of a view. Representational momentum, on 
the other hand, is concerned with predictions about time, where a prediction is made about a 
moving object with the expectation that the object will continue along its trajectory path.  
Initially, research by Hubbard (1995) suggested that representational momentum and 
boundary extension may arise from similar mechanisms. In five experiments, Hubbard 
(1995) tested memory for stationary targets as well as moving targets that were displaced 
either behind the moving target in the case of the target with slower velocities, or beyond the 
target as in the case of the target with faster velocities. Participants were presented with 
computer-animated square stimuli that portrayed movement in depth. The target with slower 
velocities contained longer retention intervals, while the target with the faster velocities 
contained shorter retention intervals. Hubbard (1995) predicted that participants should be 
more likely to accept the object as being closer than the final stimulus view actually was. He 
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further predicted that participants should be more likely to accept the object portrayed as 
farther away from the last seen stimulus view. Finally, Hubbard (1995) predicted that the 
magnitude of forward displacement will increase as target velocity increases. If participants 
experience boundary extension instead of representational momentum, they should be more 
likely to choose the object being portrayed as being a little bit farther away rather than the 
object portrayed as being a little bit closer, whether the stimuli appear to recede or to 
approach. 
The results of Hubbard (1995) showed that representational momentum occurred for 
moving stimuli, and results consistent with boundary extension occurred for stationary 
stimuli. Hubbard (1995) suggested that boundary extension and representational momentum 
may arise from either different facets of the same mechanism, or similar mechanisms. Both 
memory errors are types of displacement, and while there are ways in which they are 
different, they do not seem to differ in their fundamental mechanisms. Hubbard (1995) 
suggested that both memory errors are evoked by schemas, where boundary extension occurs 
when targets evoke a scene schema, and representational momentum occurs when targets 
evoke a motion schema the overall magnitude of forward displacement for motion in depth 
was measured to be less than the magnitude of forward displacement for motion overall. 
Memory for the smaller stationary targets appeared to be displaced in the direction of the 
observer. Memory for the larger stationary targets was displaced away from the participant; 
finally, memory for the bottom or the top edge of the stationary target was displaced, and this 
displacement occurred inside the target perimeter. (Hubbard, 1995). 
 However, one potential shortcoming of Hubbard (1995) is that the rationales for the 
conclusions drawn were not sufficient as the author seemed to suggest. Specifically, the 
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rationale for Hubbard’s conclusion was that boundary extension and representational 
momentum both share similarities in time course, rely on internal expectations about the 
world, and appeal to aspects of memory that are dynamic (Hubbard, 1995; DeLucia & 
Maldia, 2006). Although boundary extension and representational momentum share 
similarities (e.g., both involve predictions about what a person should see), this does not 
provide strong evidence that the two memory errors arise from different facets of the same 
mechanism or that they arise from similar mechanisms. DeLucia and Maldia (2006) 
examined this issue, with results differing from those  reported by Hubbard (1995). 
DeLucia and Maldia (2006) examined memory for picture boundaries with the use of 
scenes that simulated self-motion either toward or away from the object. The stimuli used in 
DeLucia and Maldia (2006) are more similar to the stimuli used in typical boundary 
extension experiments, in that the stimuli were computer-generated pictures of real objects 
on natural backgrounds such as a road with a stop sign, or a fire hydrant next to a wall. 
Simulated self-motion is the idea that the person is simulated to move toward the object or 
away from the object on the screen. Self-motion was simulated by showing a video clip that 
depicted an object moving in depth either toward or away from the participant. An example 
is a computer drawn basketball goal either appearing to approach the participant or to recede 
from the participant. They focused on three questions: First of all, does boundary extension 
occur when the types of scenes used depict simulated self-motion? Second, does depicted 
self-motion affect a person’s memory for the boundaries of a scene in a way that is 
comparable to representational momentum of the self? Their final question was whether or 
not the presence of optic-flow information has an impact on memory for the boundaries of 
scenes. Optic flow encompasses the visual experience of movement through a physical space. 
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For example, as a person walks down a hall, both the left and right peripheral sides of the 
visual field appear blurred as the person moves through the space, while the center of the 
view, where the person is fixating, remains clear. As the person moves toward the end of the 
hall, what they are approaching appears wider the closer they get. 
Experiment 1 included three conditions in which the same scenes were used. The 
conditions included a continuous-motion condition, which aimed at determining whether 
boundary extension occurs with scenes that simulate continuous self-motion in depth, an 
implied motion condition, to determine whether boundary extension happens with views that 
depict implied self-motion, and a static condition, which was intended to be a control 
condition to see how much boundary extension the final stimulus views in the motion 
condition would elicit. The scenes simulating continuous self-motion in depth depicted a 
view of an object that either became larger and more close-up, or smaller, becoming more 
wide-angle. This created the illusion that the participant was moving either toward the object 
in space or away from the object. Scenes depicting implied self-motion also depicted change 
in depth, which were not continuous, but shown in three separate pictures rather than a video 
clip of the changes in depth. In the static condition, the object in the view did not get larger 
or smaller – it stayed the same and did not change. The static condition was the final view of 
the motion sequence, which was either close-up or wide-angle. Memory was tested by 
providing participants with a 5-point scale to rate whether the test picture was the same as the 
stimulus picture, more close-up or more wide-angle. There were two versions of the memory 
test, used in two separate experiments. In the first version, all of the stimuli were shown, and 
then memory was tested for the final view for each. The time between the end of stimulus 
presentation and the start of the memory test was approximately 4 min. In the second version, 
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memory was tested after each stimulus presentation with a 250 ms retention interval. It was 
hypothesized that if moving scenes also activate the scene schema as static scenes 
presumably do, then the motion should not affect boundary extension. Boundary extension 
should not be increased or decreased by moving scenes. However, if the moving scenes 
activate the motion schema that underlies representational momentum, then boundary 
extension should not occur. Finally, it was also hypothesized that if participants take in 
veridical information about the environment from optic flow in the continuous-motion 
condition, neither representational momentum nor boundary extension should occur with the 
moving scenes. Furthermore, participants’ memories should be more accurate in the 
continuous motion condition than in the implied-motion condition (DeLucia & Maldia, 
2006).  
 The results of Experiment 1 indicated that there were no significant effects of motion 
on boundary extension in the 4 min retention interval condition, but boundary extension was 
found in all three conditions.  The 250 ms condition allowed the authors to test their 
hypotheses about implied motion, representational momentum, and boundary extension, 
because memory was tested after each stimulus in the experiment, so the authors could assess 
memory across the same retention interval as representational momentum has been found to 
occur. Because of this, the results I describe are from that condition. Results revealed that 
there was no distortion in the static condition or the implied-motion condition. However, in 
the continuous-motion condition, boundary extension occurred. The results support the 
activation of a scene schema because motion continuity did not affect boundary ratings. 
However, the results also suggest that the schema activated when the test view is preceded by 
self-motion is not the same schema that is activated when the test view is preceded by 
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depicted self-motion. The effect of implied self-motion was not consistent with the motion 
schema that was predicted to underlie representational momentum. This is because the 
direction of the effect of motion was opposite of what was predicted, according to the motion 
schema. According to the motion schema, implied self-motion that creates a close-up view 
should not elicit boundary extension. The results of Experiment 1 revealed that the motion 
sequences elicited the most boundary extension. Because the results of Experiment 1 could 
have been because the types of scenes that were used may not have elicited representational 
momentum, Experiment 2 addressed this concern.  
Experiment 2 assessed memory for the position of the self with two different scenes. 
One scene depicted a mug, while the other scene depicted a beach ball. The mug scene 
started out as a wide-angle view, but ended as a medium-angle view, whereas the beach ball 
scene began as a medium-angle view and ended as a close-up view. Each probe could be the 
same as in the final stimulus image or different in terms of perceived distance from the 
participant, and it was displaced either farther in the direction of the implied motion 
trajectory or in the direction opposite of the motion. The probe was the test picture that was 
shown after the motion sequence. Participants were asked to report whether or not each probe 
picture was the same as before the final position of the object in the stimulus sequence, or 
different. The results of Experiment 2 indicated that the results of Experiment 1 did not occur 
because of the type of scene depicted (DeLucia & Maldia, 2006).  
The results of DeLucia and Maldia (2006) showed that boundary extension happened 
with views that depict motion. The motion affected memory for the boundaries of the view, 
but this effect of motion was not consistent with representational momentum of the self. 
Boundary extension occurred for scenes that simulated self-motion, however the mean 
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boundary scores were different for the static scenes than they were for the scenes that 
simulated self-motion. Boundary scores for scenes that simulated implied self-motion did not 
differ from scenes that simulated continuous self-motion. If the effect of motion had been 
consistent with representational momentum of the self, boundary restriction would have 
occurred. Information about the optical expansion pattern did not have the predicted effect on 
memory for the position of the self (Delucia & Maldia, 2006).  The optical expansion pattern 
was predicted to give participants accurate information about object motion, which should 
have resulted in accurate memory for the final position of the self, relative to the object. 
However, boundary extension still occurred. When the views depicted self-motion in a 
forward direction, the participants remembered the views as being more wide-angle than they 
remembered the static scenes, and the authors suggest that a scene schema that was activated 
by the picture of a static scene was different from the scene schema that was activated by a 
moving scene (DeLucia & Maldia, 2006).  
Based on their results, the authors concluded that the mechanisms that underlie both 
representational momentum and boundary extension differ, in that they each process different 
information. In the case of boundary extension, the underlying mechanism is the scene 
schema, which processes spatial and global properties of the scene. The scene schema aids in 
integrating successive views. In the case of representational momentum, on the other hand, 
the underlying mechanism is the motion schema, which processes local and global changes, 
as well as the details of a scene. The motion schema also incorporates optic-flow information 
and helps individuals to anticipate changes in the stimulus (Delucia & Maldia, 2006). 
Munger et al. (2005) also examined the possible relationship between boundary 
extension and representational momentum. Their design was similar to DeLucia and Maldia 
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(2006), but they used only approach sequences for testing for boundary extension and 
representational momentum. In concordance with DeLucia and Maldia (2006), they 
hypothesized that if participants were to rate the test view as too close, that would suggest 
that boundary extension is occurring (Munger et al., 2005). 
 All participants received three blocks of trials, with the blocks in the same order, and 
the trial types were each presented in their own blocks. In their experiment, Munger et al. 
(2005) showed participants single close-up photographs with the goal of measuring baseline 
boundary extension, and all test pictures were identical close-ups. After viewing the test 
picture, participants were asked to choose whether the test picture was the same, or whether 
it was different from the stimulus picture, using a five-point rating scale. They then presented 
three-picture approach sequences, which were similar to the implied motion approach 
sequences presented in DeLucia and Maldia (2006). Each stimulus picture was shown for 
250 ms, and a 250 ms blank inter-stimulus interval (ISI) was presented between stimulus 
images. This was followed by a 250 ms retention interval and the test picture, which was a 
close-up and identical to the last stimulus picture shown. Finally boundary extension was 
measured again. Representational momentum was measured in Block 3, using the same 
stimulus and presentation as in Block 2. The same boundary extension test that was given in 
Block 1 was given in Block 2. For each participant, the authors had a measure of boundary 
extension for static scenes, a measure of boundary extension for the approach sequence, and 
a separate measure of representational momentum.  
  Participants were divided into three groups based on whether they showed boundary 
extension, boundary restriction, or no directional distortion for the pictures in Block 1. The 
view ratings for Block 2 were analyzed separately for each group. Overall, participants who 
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either had no distortion for the single photographs or displayed significant boundary 
restriction experienced more boundary extension for memory of the final view in the 
approach sequence, which is the opposite of what one would predict if representational 
momentum were affecting participants’ memories of the final views of the implied motion 
condition (Munger et al., 2005). The group that showed no distortion in Block 1 showed 
significant boundary extension in Block 2, and the group that showed boundary restriction in 
Block 1 showed nonsignificant boundary extension in Block 2.  The results indicated that 
how readily participants extended the boundaries on a single view had a large impact on how 
they responded to the approach conditions in a boundary extension task. However, this was 
not the case for the representational momentum task. In Block 3, they found representational 
momentum and they also found that participants’ representational momentum scores did not 
correlate with their boundary extension scores in either Block 1 or Block 2.  Furthermore, 
participants who experienced no distortion for the single views, or experienced boundary 
restriction, showed more boundary extension before the approach sequence, which is the 
opposite of representational momentum.  They further concluded that the interaction between 
baseline boundary extension and baseline representational momentum implies that boundary 
extension appears to precede the inclusion of movement into the mental representation of the 
scene. Based on their results, they concluded that boundary extension and representational 
momentum are separate memory errors.  
Simulated self-motion does not appear to apply to boundary extension, but that 
doesn’t necessarily mean that boundary extension and representational momentum are not 
related, given that previous research has examined only one type of simulated motion. 
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Consequently, the current study addresses how boundary extension may be affected by 
perceived motion of an object, such as a person, frisbee, ball, or animal. 
Previous experiments have examined simulated self-motion rather than motion of an 
object across a horizontal path in a scene (DeLucia & Maldia, 2006; Hubbard, 1995; Munger 
et al., 2005). The current experiment addresses object motion in scenes, where the direction 
of motion travels horizontally across the view. The type of motion being addressed in the 
current experiment is something that people experience on a regular basis. Understanding 
this type of motion is necessary to understanding how people remember scene views. 
The Current Experiment 
The current experiment focuses on whether or not a type of implied motion other than 
self-motion affects boundary extension. As described here, previous research concerning this 
issue has focused on representational momentum of the self. The literature is mixed 
concerning whether or not these two memory errors are related, with some research (DeLucia 
and Maldia, 2006; Munger et al., 2005) concluding that the two phenomena are not related, 
and other research (Hubbard, 1995) suggesting that boundary extension and representational 
momentum are related. However, Hubbard’s conclusions may be limited because of the type 
of stimuli he used. The current study addressed boundary extension for objects that depict 
motion toward their implied trajectory path, either toward the left border of the view or the 
right border. This is different from depicted self-motion, which concerns the idea that the 
person is moving either toward or further away from a view.  
To test the idea, there were four trial types. This included a forward motion depiction, 
a backward motion depiction, and both forward and backward conditions in an incoherent 
motion condition. The motion sequences consisted of an object appearing at three different 
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positions against the same background, for example, on the left side, the middle, and the right 
side. The incoherent motion condition started off with the middle slide, with the sequence 
being either middle, first last, or middle, last, first. Each of the four conditions contained 10 
pictures, with a total of 40 trials. All views were as close up as they could be to permit the 
depiction of motion, and the final view in each stimulus sequence was close-up with respect 
to the distance between the object’s final position and the border closest to it. After 
participants viewed each stimulus sequence they were presented with a border-adjustment 
test, in which they were asked to adjust the borders of each test picture to match the view 
from the last seen picture.  This allowed for assessment of the remembered distance between 
the object that was depicted to be moving and the border it was depicted to be moving 
toward. 
Hubbard (1995) suggested that if representational momentum does influence 
boundary extension, one explanation may be that boundary extension and representational 
momentum are processed by the same mechanism. This is consistent with Whitney and 
Cavanagh (2000) as well as Freyd (1987, 1992). The basic idea behind this rationale is that 
boundary extension reflects dynamic properties of a mental representation, and it can be 
influenced by information regarding the physical principles in the scene (Courtney & 
Hubbard, 2008).  
Reed and Vinson (1996) framed this concept from a physics perspective, in which a 
moving object has physical momentum that carries it along its trajectory path. To stop the 
moving object, an opposing force must be applied to it. However, unless the force is strong 
enough, the object will keep moving for a certain amount of time, over a certain distance. 
Similar to this, the mental representation of an object will continue to move along the implied 
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trajectory path, even after the moving object itself has stopped. Just as a moving object has 
physical momentum, a mental representation has representational momentum (Reed & 
Vinson, 1996). Reed and Vinson (1996) tested the hypothesis that prior knowledge about an 
object’s typical movement would affect motion representation. They compared results where 
representational momentum was elicited by objects with different motion trajectories. Reed 
and Vinson (1996) found that conceptual knowledge about an object’s normal motion 
trajectory did affect the magnitude of representational momentum. In other words, 
conceptual knowledge affected participants’ representation of motion. 
Based on the findings of Reed and Vinson (1996), I hypothesized that there would be 
the following outcome: the forward-motion condition should show the least amount of 
boundary extension or possibly boundary restriction. This would be followed by the 
backward-motion condition, followed by the two incoherent-motion conditions. The goal of 
my hypothesis was not to assess overall boundary extension; it was to assess memory for the 
border closest to the end of the object’s trajectory. My hypothesis was based on boundary 
extension and representational momentum sharing a common mechanism.  
Experiment 1a 
Method 
Participants. A total of 64 undergraduates who were registered with the psychology 
department subject pool participated in the experiment. This sample size was based on 
previous boundary extension research that has used a border-adjustment test (Gagnier et al., 
2013). Participants were recruited through the Psychology Subject Pool by registering on 
software called SONA. After registering students could elect to sign up for the experiment 
listed in SONA. IRB approval for the experiment was obtained on December 9, 2013, as can 
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be seen in Appendix A. All participants were treated in accordance with appropriate ethical 
guidelines. The consent form given to all participants can be seen in Appendix B.  
Apparatus and stimuli. Stimuli were presented, and participants’ responses were 
recorded with a Dell Optiplex 755 computer with 4 mb of RAM and a video card with 512 
mb of video RAM. Stimuli were displayed on a Dell P-1130 CRT monitor was used, with the 
refresh rate set at 120 Hz. Images were shown at a resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels in 32-bit 
color.  The full screen subtended 28° x 22° of visual angle at a viewing distance of 80 cm.  
The display program was based on a template program provided by SR Research Inc., written 
in C, which was used to display the stimuli and record participants’ responses  
 Stimuli consisted of 12 background/object pairs, using both indoor and outdoor 
scenes. Appendix C lists a description of each background and its object. The backgrounds 
included scenes of a kitchen, a backyard with a pool, a field, and other common scenes. Each 
background had one object added to it, although different backgrounds contained different 
numbers of other objects. Examples of the added objects include a person jogging or a 
running horse. Each stimulus image had three versions, each using the same background but 
with the object in three in three separate positions on each trial: the left side, the center, and 
the right side of the image. Objects were added to the backgrounds using Adobe PhotoShop 
CS5. Ten of the background/object pairs were used for the experimental trials, and two were 
used for the practice trials. The stimulus and initial test views subtended approximately 15° x 
10° of visual angle, with each view shown on a black background. 
Procedure and design. In this experiment, participants saw a total of 40 trials, with 
an additional eight practice trials. There was a forward-coherent condition, in which the 
picture sequence showed a motion progression in a forward direction (e.g., the object 
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appeared on the left side, then in the center, then on the right side); a backward-coherent 
condition, in which the picture sequence showed a motion progression in a backward 
direction; and both of those conditions in an incoherent-motion condition, in which both 
started off with the middle slide, with the object locations being middle, first, last, or middle, 
last, first.  
Each trial started with a central fixation cross, and the participants started each trial 
by pressing the space bar. Each picture was shown once for 250 ms. Between each image 
with an object, the background without the object was shown for 250 ms. Immediately after 
this, a 250 ms mask appeared, separating the final stimulus picture from the test picture. The 
test picture appeared immediately after the mask and was always identical to the final image 
in the stimulus sequence. Participants were instructed to maintain central fixation until the 
test picture appeared. The border-adjustment test allowed the participant to move the four 
borders of the picture either out or in, allowing the view to be adjusted to be either more 
close-up or wide-angle. The borders were always be in the same position as they were in the 
stimulus views when the test picture appeared after the mask, and participants were be told 
that the borders may or may not need to be adjusted. After the border-adjustment test, 
participants rated their confidence in the accuracy of their border adjustments on a four-point 
scale. The four labels on the scale were sure, pretty sure, not sure, and DRP, which stands for 
do not remember picture. The four practice trials consisted of the two practice scenes being 
shown in all four conditions, and during the experiment, participants saw the 10 experimental 
images four times – once in each condition – yielding a total of 40 experimental trials. The 
backgrounds were always shown in the same sequence across participants, and the actual 
sequence of conditions was counterbalanced. For example, the picture for Trial 1 was the 
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same for all of the participants, but some participants saw the forward-coherent condition 
(FC), while others saw the backward-coherent condition (BC), or the forward-incoherent 
condition (FI), or the backward-incoherent condition (BI). For half of the participants, the 
images were mirror reversed, so that all participants saw each of the image/background pairs 
showing motion in the direction of the right border, and the left border. 
Results 
I excluded trials from analysis on which participants made a DRP response. For the 
four conditions, the percentage of DRP trials was as follows: FC: 0.63%; FI: 1.43%; BC: 
0.48%; BI: 0.79%. I excluded a participant’s data from analysis if the mean change in area 
was 3 SDs or greater than the overall mean of all participants for at least two of the four 
conditions (Gagnier et al., 2013). Based on this criterion, one participant’s data was excluded 
from all analyses.  
To test the hypothesis that there would be an effect of motion condition, I ran a one-
way ANOVA to see if the means for motion condition in the four conditions differed from 
one another.  I also ran a contrast test to find out if the differences were in the order that I 
predicted. All hypotheses were tested using the distance from the border closest to the object 
(i.e., either the left or right border) to the part of the object that was closest to the border. 
Results of the ANOVA showed that motion condition affected memory for the position of the 
front border (i.e., the border that the object appears to be approaching) relative to the object, 
F(1.04, 64.48) = 20.99, p <.001. Because Mauchly’s test for sphericity was significant, I am 
reporting the Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom and p value. To determine 
whether the differences between means were in the order I predicted (FC, BC, FI, BI), I 
conducted a set of repeated contrasts. These contrasts revealed that as I predicted, the mean 
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for the FC conditions was significantly smaller than the mean for the BC condition, F(1, 62) 
= 20.00, p < .001.  Contrary to my prediction, the mean for the BC condition was 
significantly greater than the mean for the FI condition, F(1, 62) = 20.00, p < .001.  Finally, 
the mean for the FI conditions was significantly smaller than the mean for the BI condition, 
F(1, 62) = 24.36, p < .001. Results showed the following order, from the border that was 
moved the farthest inward to the border that was moved the farthest outward: FC (M  = -
15.35, SD = 29.50), FI (M = -10.24, SD = 18.85), BI (M = 8.39, SD = 13.04), BC (M = 11.96, 
SD = 20.02). 
Because the data did not support my hypothesis, I conducted a 2 x 2 (Motion 
direction [forward, backward] x Motion coherence [coherent, incoherent]) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) to determine the effects of motion direction and coherence on memory 
for border position. There was no main effect for coherence, F(1, 62) = 2.01, p = .162, but 
there was a main effect of  motion direction, F(1, 62) = 21.91, p < .001. When motion 
direction was forward, participants moved the border significantly inward, toward the object. 
When motion was backward, participants moved the border significantly outward, away from 
the object. In other words, when motion was forward, participants got boundary restriction 
for that border, but when the motion was backward, participants got boundary extension for 
that border. The results also revealed that there was an interaction F(1, 62) = 11.24, p = .001. 
The interaction reflects that when motion was coherent, participants moved the approaching 
border closer to the object for the forward condition, but in the backward condition, 
participants moved the approaching border further away from the object. The results of 2 x 2 
ANOVA suggest that the direction of motion had a clear but unexpected effect on 
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participants’ memory for the location of the border closest to the end of the object’s motion 
path.  
To assess if boundary extension occurred, I looked at the overall change in area for 
each condition. Results revealed that boundary extension did not occur in any of the four 
conditions: FC (M = -1.15, SD = 7.52), FI (M = -0.30, SD = 6.79), BC (M = -0.34, SD = 
8.18), BI (M = -0.11, SD = 7.99). 
Experiment 1b 
After being informed that some participants may have been confused about the 
instructions in Experiment 1a, specifically, that they were supposed to pay attention to just 
the object’s location instead of trying to remember the overall view of each scene, I decided 
to replicate Experiment 1a. The only difference between the two experiments was that 
Experiment 1b had slightly modified instructions. In Experiment 1b, the wording of the 
instructions was changed to make it clear that participants should try to remember the overall 
view of the scenes and not focus on the object’s location.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were 63 undergraduates who signed up to participate in the 
experiment for one ELC credit. None of the participants in Experiment 1b participated in 
Experiment 1a. 
Apparatus and stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 
1a. 
Procedure and design. The procedure and design were the same as in Experiment 
1a, with the exception that the instructions were changed to specify that participants were to 
pay attention to the overall view of each scene, rather than the object’s location. 
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Results 
I excluded trials from analysis on which participants made a DRP response. For the 
four conditions, the percentage of DRP trials was as follows: FC: 0.34%; FI: 0.51%; BC: 
0.34%; BI: 0.68%. I excluded a participant’s data from analysis if the mean change in area 
was 3 SDs or greater than the overall mean of all participants for at least two of the four 
conditions. Based on this criterion, four participants’ data were excluded from all analyses.  
As in the first experiment, I tested the hypothesis that there would be an effect of 
motion condition. I ran a one-way ANOVA to see if the means in the four conditions differed 
from one another.  The results of the ANOVA showed that there was a significant effect of 
condition, F(2.03, 117.59) = 8.94, p < .001. Because Mauchly’s test for sphericity was 
significant, I am reporting the Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom and p-value. 
To determine whether the differences between means were in the order I predicted, I 
conducted a set of repeated contrasts.  These contrasts revealed that the mean for the FC 
conditions was significantly smaller than the mean for the BC condition, F(1, 58) = 9.18, p = 
.004.  However, contrary to my prediction, the mean for the BC condition was significantly 
greater than the mean for the FI condition, F(1, 58) = 10.53, p = .002.  Finally, the mean for 
the FI conditions was significantly smaller than the mean for the BI condition, F(1, 58) = 
12.99, p = .001. Results showed the following order, from the border that was moved the 
farthest inward to the border that was moved the farthest outward: FI (M = -0.26, SD = 4.27), 
FC (M = -0.07, SD = 3.70), BI (M = 1.90, SD = 3.70), BC (M = 1.83, SD = 4.25). 
Because the data did not support my hypothesis, I conducted a 2 x 2 (Motion 
direction [forward, backward] x Motion coherence [coherent, incoherent]) ANOVA to 
determine the effects of motion direction and coherence on memory for border position.  The 
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results revealed that there was no main effect for coherence F(1, 58) = 0.04, p = .850, but 
there was a main effect of motion direction F(1, 58) = 13.53, p = .001.  There was no 
interaction between motion direction and coherence, F(1, 58) = 0.24, p = .629. The lack of 
interaction may have been the result of the instruction change. The results of the 2 x 2 
ANOVA suggest that motion direction affected participant’s memories for border position 
relative to the object, and coherence did not. 
To assess if boundary extension occurred, I looked at the overall change in area for 
each condition. Results revealed that boundary extension occurred in all of the four 
conditions: FC (M = 1.16, SD = 4.36), FI (M = 1.45, SD = 5.11), BC (M = 1.38, SD = 5.19), 
BI(M = 1.49, SD = 5.36). Again, the instruction change may have caused the different results 
in Experiment 1b, compared to the results of Experiment 1a. 
Experiment 1c 
The goal of Experiment 1c was to address potential issues from Experiment 1a and 
Experiment 1b. Because of the nature of the task, participants could have been adjusting the 
border closest to the object’s ending position based on memory for the view or memory for 
the object’s location. Because the data do not allow me to determine which of these 
possibilities may have been occurring, I chose to make this experiment more similar to a 
representational momentum experiment and changed the instructions to indicate that 
participants should try to remember the object’s exact final location as well as the overall 
view to see if I would still get the same pattern of results.  
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Method 
Participants. Participants were 64 undergraduates who signed up to participate in the 
experiment for one ELC credit. None of the participants in Experiment 1c participated in 
Experiment 1a or 1b. 
Apparatus and stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 
1a. 
Procedure and design. The procedure and design were the same as in Experiment 
1a, with the exception that the instructions were changed to indicate that the participants 
should pay attention to the object’s location in addition to trying to remember the overall 
view of each scene. 
Results 
I excluded trials from analysis on which participants made a DRP response. For the 
four conditions, the percentage of DRP trials was as follows: FC: 0.79%; FI: 1.27%; BC: 
1.27%; BI: 0.63%. I excluded a participant’s data from analysis if the mean change in area 
was 3 SDs or greater than the overall mean of all participants for at least two of the four 
conditions. Based on this criterion, one participant’s data was excluded from all analyses.  
To test the hypothesis that there would be an effect of motion condition, I ran a one-
way ANOVA to see if the means in the four conditions differed from one another. The 
results of the ANOVA showed that motion condition affected memory for the position of the 
front border (i.e., the border that the object appears to be approaching) relative to the object, 
F(1.06, 65.73) = 8.534, p = .004. To determine whether the differences between means were 
in the order I predicted FC (Forward Coherent), BC (Backward Coherent), FI (Forward 
Incoherent), BI (Backward Incoherent), I conducted a set of repeated contrasts. These 
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contrasts revealed that the mean for the FC conditions was significantly smaller than the 
mean for the BC condition, F(1, 62) = 8.10, p = .006. Contrary to my prediction, the mean 
for the BC condition was significantly greater than the mean for the FI condition, F(1, 62) = 
20.00, p < .001.  Finally, the mean for the FI conditions was significantly smaller than the 
mean for the BI condition, F(1, 62) = 8.82, p = .003. The results showed the following order, 
from the border that was moved the farthest inward to the border that was moved the farthest 
outward: FC (M= -4.21, SD=14.11), FI (M= -2.13, SD=7.99), BI (M=4.71, SD=10.74), BC 
(M=5.32, SD=13.59).  
Because the data did not support my hypothesis, I conducted a 2 x 2 (Motion 
direction [forward, backward] x Motion coherence [coherent, incoherent]) ANOVA to 
determine the effects of motion direction and coherence on memory for border position. 
There was no main effect for coherence, F(1, 62) = 3.92, p = .052, but there was a main 
effect of  motion direction, F(1, 62) = 8.93, p = .004. When motion direction was forward, 
participants moved the border significantly inward, toward the object. When motion was 
backward, participants moved the border significantly outward, away from the object. In 
other words, when motion was forward, participants got boundary restriction for that border, 
but when the motion was backward, participants got boundary extension for that border. 
Results also revealed that there was no interaction F(1, 62) = 3.68, p = .060.  The results of 2 
x 2 ANOVA revealed the same effect of motion that I found in Experiment 1a and an effect 
similar to what I found in Experiment 1b. The only difference was that in Experiment 1b, the 
change in border position for the forward-motion conditions was not significant.  
To assess if boundary extension occurred, I looked at the overall change in area for 
each condition: FC (M = 0.97, SD = 5.51), FI (M = 1.94, SD = 5.77), BC (M = 1.21, SD = 
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5.26), BI(M = 1.82, SD = 6.59). I found significant boundary extension in the FI (M = 1.94, 
SD = 5.77) and BI (M = 1.82, SD = 6.59) conditions. However, I did not find boundary 
extension in the FC (M = 0.97, SD = 5.51) or the BC (M = 1.21, SD = 5.26) conditions.  
Discussion 
How does implied motion of an object affect a person’s representations of the spatial 
expanse of scene views? In the initial investigation of this question, I tested participants’ 
memories for the view of the border closest to the end of the object’s motion path, and I 
asked whether object motion would affect that memory. This included a forward-motion 
condition, a backward-motion condition, and both incoherent versions of the forward and 
backward conditions.  Across all three versions of my experiment, I found a fairly consistent 
pattern of results.  Specifically, I found a significant effect of motion, but the effect of motion 
was not what I predicted. The results of the 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed that motion direction had 
an effect on memory, but the effect of motion coherence was not consistent.  
The results of Experiment 1a showed an effect that was different from what I 
predicted, based on the results of the contrast test. The results revealed that there was an 
effect of motion condition, in which the four conditions fell in the following order from 
closest to the object, to furthest from the object: FC, FI, BI, BC. The direction of motion did 
have an effect on participants’ memory for the border position relative to the object. In the 
forward-motion condition, participants remembered the border to be closer to the object’s 
final position than it actually was. In the backward-motion condition, participants 
remembered the approaching border to be further outward from the object than it actually 
was. Even though the effect of motion coherence was not significant, there was a slight trend 
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toward more memory distortion for the coherent conditions. I did not find significant 
boundary extension. 
The results of Experiment 1b again showed an effect that was different from what I 
predicted, based on the results of the contrast test. The results revealed that there was an 
effect of motion condition in which the four conditions fell in the following order from 
closest to the object, to farthest from the object: FI, FC, BI, BC.  The direction of motion did 
have an effect on participants’ memory for the border position relative to the object. In the 
forward-motion condition, participants remembered the border to be closer to the object’s 
final position than it actually was, although results were not significantly different from no 
change in position. In the backward-motion condition, participants remembered the 
approaching border to be farther away from the object than it actually was. The effect of 
motion coherence was not significant, which may have been because the mean changes in 
border position were much smaller than they were in Experiment 1a. However, significant 
boundary extension was found in all four conditions.   
The results of Experiment 1c revealed that there was an effect of motion condition in 
which the four conditions fell in the following order from closest to the object, to farthest 
from the object: FI, FC, BI, BC.  The direction of motion did have an effect on participants’ 
memory for the border position relative to the object. In the forward-motion condition, 
participants remembered the border as closer to the object’s final position than it actually 
was. In the backward-motion condition, participants remembered the approaching border as 
farther away from the object than it actually was. Even though the effect of motion coherence 
was not significant, there was a trend toward more memory distortion for the coherent 
conditions. Significant boundary extension was found in the FI and BI conditions.   
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Regardless of the change in instructions across all three experiments, participants 
moved the approaching border inward in the forward condition but moved the border 
outward in the backward condition. In other words, the forward condition always showed 
boundary restriction, and the backward condition always showed boundary extension. There 
was a nonsignificant trend of coherent motion strengthening the effect of motion direction in 
Experiments 1a and 1c. This suggests that coherence may have had some part to play in the 
overall scheme of things, although its effect was inconsistent.   
Interpretation of Results 
Overall, the results suggest that people appear to be influenced by conceptual 
understanding of what is going on or should be occurring (Courtney & Hubbard, 2008; Reed 
& Vinson, 1996). When an object appeared to be moving in a forward direction, participants 
seemed to anticipate the continuation of motion and remembered the border as being closer 
to the object. The results of Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c, were not consistent with standard 
representational momentum research, such as Experiment 3 of Hubbard (1995). On the other 
hand, the results were consistent with the results of Reed and Vinson (1996), because the 
pattern of border adjustments was consistent with participants remembering the direction of 
motion being the direction the object was facing instead of the direction it actually moved.  
This may suggest that conceptual knowledge of how the objects moved more than general 
knowledge of the principles of physics was affecting participants’ memories in the present 
experiment. According to this possibility, when participants moved the border farther inward 
in the forward conditions, they did so because of their conceptual understanding of the type 
of motion they were viewing. Likewise, in the backward condition, participants moved the 
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border farther outward. These border adjustments are consistent with participants’ conceptual 
knowledge of how these objects moved. 
A common concern between the three different experiments was how participants 
were interpreting the instructions. In Experiment 1a, it came to my attention that some of the 
participants may have been confused about the instructions; specifically that they were 
supposed to pay attention to only the object’s location instead of to the view. Because I was 
concerned that the participants may have been trying to remember the object’s location, I 
decided to replicate Experiment 1a, with slightly modified instructions. In Experiment 1b, the 
wording was altered to make it clear to participants that they should attempt to remember the 
overall view of the scenes and not focus solely on the location of the object. In Experiment 
1c, I instructed participants to remember both the object’s final location and the location of 
the four borders and found the same effect of motion direction. The pattern of results in 
Experiment 1a was consistent with the other two experiments, which suggests that the 
wording in Experiment 1a may not have been an issue.  
Integration with Previous Research 
The results of the current set of experiments do not fit with DeLucia and Maldia 
(2006) or Munger et al. (2005), who examined the relationship between boundary extension 
and representational momentum. DeLucia and Maldia (2006) found greater boundary 
extension in the implied-motion condition than in the static-scene condition. It should be 
noted that in their implied-motion condition, there were differences between their static 
condition and their motion conditions. This could have had something to do with why 
participants experienced greater boundary extension in the implied-motion condition. 
Furthermore, if conceptual knowledge of motion had been affecting boundary extension, 
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there would have been less boundary extension in their motion conditions than in the static 
condition. In other words, results of DeLucia and Maldia (2006) were not consistent with 
conceptual knowledge of motion affecting boundary extension, whereas the results of my 
experiment suggest that representational momentum, conceptual knowledge of objects’ 
motion, or both, could affect boundary extension. 
In Munger et al. (2005), similar differences between the implied-motion condition 
and the static condition were present. Munger et al. (2005) found that how readily 
participants extended the boundaries of a single view whether they experienced boundary 
extension, boundary restriction, or no directional distortion, had a large impact on how they 
responded to the approach conditions in a boundary-extension task in the implied-motion 
condition. Munger et al. (2005) found a main effect of motion when they looked at all of 
their participants. There was more boundary extension for the motion condition than for the 
static condition. Again, the effect of motion that they found was not consistent with the 
results of the present experiment or with representational momentum affecting boundary 
extension.  
One issue to be taken into consideration is whether or not the different types of 
motion (i.e., implied self-motion, object motion) might have something to do with the 
different effects of motion, as well as potential conceptual effects with the stimuli of the 
present experiment. DeLucia and Maldia (2006) addressed simulated self-motion, which is 
distinctly different from perceived motion of an object traveling along a horizontal path. In 
other words, DeLucia and Maldia (2006) assessed implied self-motion using objects that 
would  not be expected to move themselves, based on conceptual knowledge about the 
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objects, whereas the current experiment assessed object motion, such as a person skating in a 
horizontal direction.  
Whether or not the current set of experiments fits as a whole into the representational 
momentum literature, it certainly fits into the conceptual framework discussed by Reed and 
Vinson (1996). Reed and Vinson (1996) described representational momentum as the mind 
accounting for what it knows about the laws of the physical world, as well as what it knows 
about how specific objects move or do not move, in an attempt to make a prediction dealing 
with time. This account helps to make sense of the overall results of the current set of 
experiments, in which participants seemed to be making inferences about what they saw, or 
should have seen.  
Limitations 
There are several limitations of the current set of experiments. First of all, the 
instructions across the three experiments were slightly different from one another. My initial 
concern was that the differences in the wording of the instructions across the three 
experiments might interfere with what I was actually measuring.  However, the results across 
all three experiments showed a similar pattern, so it seems unlikely that participants in the 
different experiments were adjusting the borders based on different information (i.e., memory 
for the view vs. memory for object location). 
Another limitation to consider is the backgrounds used in the current experiment. The 
backgrounds depicted in DeLucia and Maldia (2006) and in almost every other 
representational momentum experiment except for Munger et al. (2005) were very simple. 
Objects were displayed on very simple backgrounds that were not actual photographs but 
were created by a computer. It is possible that the complexity of my backgrounds might have 
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had an impact on the effect of motion. My rationale for this possibility is that for my stimuli, 
there was much more information available in the background of each of the scenes. In other 
words, the backgrounds in my experiment were much more similar to real-life scenes, 
compared to those used by DeLucia and Maldia (2006), which may have given participants 
too much visual information to pay attention to during the stimulus presentation. In other 
words, the views in my experiment contained full scenes similar to what a person would view 
in real life, whereas previous experiments have depicted simple objects on a nearly blank 
background. This could explain why the effect of motion direction would be consistent with 
participants not encoding the full motion sequence, but rather just the last position of the 
object, and then inferred its direction of motion from the direction the object was facing.  
 Another potential limitation is the fact that the stimuli did not consistently elicit 
overall boundary extension. The only exception was Experiment 1b, and even then the 
amount of boundary extension was very small. This limited my ability to see if there was an 
effect of motion on overall memory for spatial expanse. Boundary extension was found 
across all three experiments in the backward-motion conditions but only for the border that 
the object appeared to be approaching. The fact that overall boundary extension was not 
found in Experiment 1a and Experiment 1c limits my ability to draw conclusions about how 
object motion affects boundary extension for overall views of scenes, as opposed to boundary 
extension for part of the view. 
Conclusions 
Results of Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c revealed that motion did have an effect on 
participants’ memories of the scenes boundaries. While it is difficult to tease apart the effects 
of boundary extension and representational momentum in this context, some type of 
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anticipatory prediction may have been occurring when participants were presented with 
scenes that depicted some type of motion. There appeared to be a strong effect of conceptual 
knowledge of how the objects in the scenes moved. This suggests that participants may have 
been incorporating knowledge about the motion occurring in the scene, as well as knowledge 
about how specific objects move into their memory of the view.  
  
44 
 
References 
Carrasco, M., & McElree, B. (2001). Covert attention accelerates the rate of visual 
information processing. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America, 98, 5363-5367. 
Courtney, J.R. & Hubbard, T.L. (2008). Spatial memory and explicit knowledge: An effect of 
instruction on representational momentum. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 61, 1778-1784. 
DeLucia, P., R. & Maldia, M. (2006).Visual memory for moving scenes. The Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 59, 340-360. 
Dickinson, C. A., & Intraub, H. (2008). Transsaccadic representation of layout: What is the 
time course of boundary extension?  Journal of Experimental Psychology, 34, 543-
555. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.34.3.543 
Freyd, J.J. (1987). Dynamic mental representations. Psychological Review, 94, 427-438. 
Freyd,J.J. (1992). Dynamic representations guiding adaptive behavior. Time, Action, and 
Cognition, 66, 309-323. 
Freyd, J.J., & Finke, R.A. (1984). Representational momentum. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 10, 126-132. 
Gagnier, K.M., Dickinson, C.A., & Intraub, H. (2013). Fixating picture boundaries does not 
eliminate boundary extension: Implications for scene representation. The Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 66, 2161-2186. 
Gottesman, C.V. & Intraub, H. (2002). Surface construal and the mental representation of 
scenes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 
28, 589-599. 
45 
 
Hubbard, T. (1995). Displacement in depth: Representational momentum and boundary 
extension. Psychological Research, 59, 33-47. 
Intraub, H. (2002). Anticipatory spatial representation of natural scenes: Momentum without 
movement? Visual Cognition,9, 93-119. 
Intraub, H. (2010). Rethinking scene perception: A multisource model. Psychology of 
Learning and Motivation, 52, 231-264. 
Intraub, H., Bender, R.S., & Mangels, J.A. (1992). Looking at pictures but remembering 
scenes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18, 
180-191. 
Intraub, H. & Bodamer, J.L. (1992). Boundary extension: Fundamental aspect of pictorial 
representation or encoding artifact? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 19, 1387-1397. 
Intraub, H. & Dickinson, C.A. (2008). False memory 1/20 of a second later: What the early 
onset of boundary extension reveals about perception. Psychological Science, 19, 
1007-1013. 
Intraub, H., Gottesman, C.V., Willey, E.V., & Zuk, I.J. (2006). Boundary extension for 
briefly glimpsed photographs: Do common perceptual processes result in unexpected 
memory distortions? Journal of Memory and Language, 35, 118-134.  
Intraub, H., Hoffman, J.E.,Wetherhold, C.J., & Stoehs, S. (2006). More than meets the eye: 
The effect of planned fixations on scene representation. Perception and 
Psychophysics, 68, 759-769. 
Intraub, H., & Richardson, M. (1989). Wide-angle memories of close-up scenes. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 15, 179-187. 
46 
 
Levin, D. T., Simons, D. J., Angelone, B.L., & Chabris, C. F. (2002). Memory for central 
attended changing objects in an incidental real-world change detection paradigm. 
British Journal of Psychology, 93, 289-302.  
Matin, E. (1974). Saccadic suppression: A review and an analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 
81, 899-917. 
Munger, M. P., Owens, R., & Conway, J. E. (2005). Are boundary extension and 
representational momentum related? Visual Cognition, 12, 1041-1056. 
O’Regan, J.K. (1992). Solving the real mysteries of visual perception: The world as an 
outside memory. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 46, 461-488. 
Reed, C.L. & Vinson, N.G. (1996). Conceptual effects on representational momentum. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 22, 839-
850. 
Simons, D. (2000). Current approaches to change blindness. Visual Cognition, 7, 1-15. 
Whitney, D. & Cavanagh, P. (2000). Motion distorts visual space: Shifting the perceived 
position of remote stationary objects. Nature Neuroscience, 3, 954-959. 
  
47 
 
Appendix A 
From: IRB Administration  
Date: 12/09/2013  
RE: Notice of IRB Exemption  
Study #: 14-0121  
Study Title: Boundary-Extension and Perceived Motion  
Exemption Category: (2) Anonymous Educational Tests; Surveys, Interviews or 
Observations This study involves minimal risk and meets the exemption category cited 
above. In accordance with 45 CFR 46.101(b) and University policy and procedures, the 
research activities described in the study materials are exempt from further IRB review.  
Study Change:  Proposed changes to the study require further IRB review when the change 
involves: 
 an external funding source, 
 the potential for a conflict of interest, 
 a change in location of the research (i.e., country, school system, off site location) 
 the contact information for the Principal Investigator, 
 the addition of non-Appalachian State University faculty, staff, or students to the 
research team, or 
 the basis for the determination of exemption. Standard Operating Procedure #9 cites 
examples of changes which affect the basis of the determination of exemption on 
page 3. 
 
Investigator Responsibilities:  All individuals engaged in research with human participants 
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are responsible for compliance with University policies and procedures, and IRB 
determinations. The Principal Investigator (PI), or Faculty Advisor if the PI is a student, is 
ultimately responsible for ensuring the protection of research participants; conducting sound 
ethical research that complies with federal regulations, University policy and procedures; and 
maintaining study records. The PI should review the IRB's list of PI responsibilities.  
To Close the Study:  When research procedures with human participants are completed, 
please send the Request for Closure of IRB Review form to irb@appstate.edu.  
If you have any questions, please contact the Research Protections Office at (828) 262-7981 
(Julie) or (828) 262-2692 (Robin). 
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Appendix B 
Consent to Participate in Research 
Information to Consider About this Research 
 
Quantifying Boundary Extension and Examining Scene Viewing Patterns 
Principal Investigator: Sarah G. Hinnant 
Department: Psychology 
Contact Information: sh74810@appstate.edu; Dr. Chris Dickinson: 203 Smith-Wright Hall, 
(828) 262-2272, x415, dickinsonca@appstate.edu 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
You are invited to take part in a research study about movement and memory. If you take 
part in this study you will be one of about 240 to do so. By doing this study, we hope to learn 
about how people perceive motion and remember every day scenes. 
 
Why am I being invited to take part in this research?   
You are being invited to participate because you a healthy volunteer at least 18 years old.  If 
you volunteer to take part in this study, you will be one of about 240 people to do so.   
 
What will I be asked to do? 
The research procedures will be conducted at Smith-Wright Hall in room 216.  You will need 
to come here 1 time during the study.  Each of those visits will take about 30 minutes.  The 
total amount of time you will be asked to volunteer for this study is 30 minutes over the next 
1 day.  If you agree to be part of the research study, you will be asked to view multiple 
series of photographs of natural scenes, with each series followed by a memory test for 
each picture in the series.  Each picture will be shown for about 250 ms.  
 
If you have any uncorrected vision problems, or attention deficits that might affect 
performance in this experiment, you must inform the experimenter that you may not be 
eligible to participate.  You are not required to disclose the actual reason, however. 
 
What are possible harms or discomforts that I might experience during the 
research? 
To the best of our knowledge, the risk of harm for participating in this research study is no 
more than you would experience in everyday life.   
 
What are possible benefits of this research? 
There may be no personal benefit from your participation but the information gained by 
doing this research may help others in the future.  This study should be beneficial by adding 
knowledge about the way in which people remember moving scenes, as a result of studying 
two types of common memory errors that people encounter in every-day life. In addition, 
your participation may contribute to overall knowledge about how people study and 
remember scenes. 
 
Will I be paid for taking part in the research? 
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We will not pay you for the time you volunteer while being in this study.  You will receive 1 
Experiential Learning Credit (ELC) toward your General Psychology research participation 
requirement for today’s experiment (if you are participating for credit in another class, you 
will receive 1 ELC for that class).  The requirements and options for research participation 
have been outlined in the syllabus for your General Psychology class.  Your course 
instructor can also provide you non-research alternatives to obtain ELCs.  
 
How will you keep my private information confidential? 
This study is anonymous.  That means that no one, not even members of the research 
team, will know that the information you gave came from you.  Your information will be 
combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we write up the 
study to share it with other researchers, we will write about the combined information. You 
will not be identified in any published or presented materials.  
  
Whom can I contact if I have a question? 
The people conducting this study will be available to answer any questions concerning this 
research, now or in the future.  You may contact the Principal Investigator at 
sh74810@appsate.edu, or Dr. Chris Dickinson at 262-2272, x415.  If you have questions 
about your rights as someone taking part in research, contact the Appalachian Institutional 
Review Board Administrator at 828-262-2130 (days), through email at irb@appstate.edu or 
at Appalachian State University, Office of Research and Sponsored Programs, IRB 
Administrator, Boone, NC 28608. 
 
Do I have to participate?   
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  If you choose not to volunteer, 
there is no penalty or consequence.  If you decide to take part in the study you can still 
decide at any time that you no longer want to participate. You will not lose any benefits or 
rights you would normally have if you do not participate in the study. 
 
I have decided I want to take part in this research.  What should I do now? 
If you have read this form, had the opportunity to ask questions about the research and 
received satisfactory answers, and want to participate, then sign the consent form and keep 
a copy for your records.  
 
             
By proceeding with the activities described above, you acknowledge that you have read and 
agreed to the descriptions and terms outlined in this consent form, and voluntarily agree to 
participate in this research. 
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Appendix C 
List of Backgrounds with the Object that was Depicted in Motion 
Background Object 
Courtyard with fountain Man rollerblading 
Desert road with mountain in background Camel walking 
Outdoor pool at night with house in background Beach ball in the air 
Grassy field with trees in the background Horse galloping 
A forest with snow on the ground Deer running 
An outdoor fountain with a house in the background Boy riding a skateboard 
Outdoor brick barbeque Basketball in the air 
Outdoor pool in the daytime Bird flying 
Outdoor deck railing Butterfly flying 
Living room Man walking 
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